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Corporate Leverage and Taxes around the World
Saralyn Loney
Utah State University

Abstract:

This paper analyzes the relationship between global corporate tax rates and leverage ratios.
Theory suggests that firms facing a higher tax rate will have more debt, in order to maximize the
effect of the tax savings provided by interest payments. This paper analyzes corporations around
the world, including companies based in the United States. I show through this data that tax
rates and leverage ratios do, in fact, have a positively correlated relationship. The high-leverage,
high-tax firms should also have lower interest coverage ratios, due to the fact that they will pay
more in interest because they hold more debt. These results indicate that the use of leverage as a
tax benefit is upheld by firms in general.
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I. Introduction
The combination of debt and equity a firm holds is known as capital structure.
Corporations must weigh the benefits of issuing debt against the costs associated with such an
issuance. Debt can be costly, and too much debt can be detrimental to a company. However, a
company with little to no debt will benefit largely from issuing bonds. The benefits appear at tax
time, due to what is known as the debt tax shield. A corporation calculates their income tax bill
after all of their business expenses. By subtracting interest paid on debt from income, they save
quite a bit of money. This is considered to shift wealth to equity holders, which is the primary
goal of a corporation.
The savings in taxes is worthwhile provided it outweighs the cost of issuing the debt, or
the amount of interest paid to the debt holders. A firm must also consider the cost of bankruptcy,
as holding too much debt will increase their chances of going bankrupt. In countries such as the
United States, which has one of the highest corporate tax rates in the world, this use of leverage
to avoid taxation is often quite beneficial. Unless a company is over-levered, they will find
savings in issuing debt and will likely do so. As found in Faulkender and Smith (2014),
companies in the United States are even finding savings by extending operations to other
countries with lower tax rates rather than pay the high U.S. tax rates. Unless the income earned
abroad is repatriated, companies will avoid paying taxes at the high U.S. rate. This lowers the
corporation’s effective tax rate significantly. Desai, Foley and Hines (2004) examined similar
data with more of a focus on the source of debt, and found that the same trend of increased
leverage related to tax rates holds.
Corporations may fund their activities and investments through the issuance of debt or
equity, or cash on hand. Understanding the choices a company makes is vital to empirical
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researchers and the market. A low-risk, low-debt firm could be a good investment for a lender
wishing to diversify their holdings, and could be charged a lower interest rate on a new debt
issuance. Knowing the relationship between risk and return and realizing that the use of leverage
in the United States can be used for the purpose of shielding income from taxation may help
investors and researchers understand and forecast firm behavior.
In this paper, I am looking at whether or not the same use of leverage to protect income
from governmental taxation is practiced globally. I am examining leverage with the same
controls as Faulkender and Smith (2014) using a global data set.

The difference is that

Faulkender and Smith (2014) focuses on companies incorporated in the U.S. and their foreign
holdings, while I examine companies incorporated around the world. They examined whether or
not these companies used their foreign affiliates in the same way, shielding income from lower
local tax rates through debt as well as avoiding U.S. high tax rates through their foreign
affiliates. Their findings indicate that companies are, in fact, using both and show that taxes are
of a first order concern.
Understanding the use of leverage is a cornerstone of corporate finance. Researchers
need this information to analyze economic policy, banks may use it to help determine interest
rates and to find new clients and key management in a corporation should be able to determine
the optimal leverage ratio for the firm. Comprehending the exploitation of the debt tax shield
can be beneficial to the entire market. For example, say a good financial economist went to
work for a government entity. If she has a good understanding of this legal form of tax
minimization, she may be able to help create policies that would beneficial to the United States
as a whole. She may realize that a lower corporate tax rate in the U.S. would incentivize
companies to abandon foreign affiliates and repatriate all funds.

In so doing, they will
3

effectively create more jobs and increase the GDP of the United States. This would be highly
beneficial to the country (or market) as a whole, and it all starts with an understanding of what
the debt tax shield is and who is using it.
The benefits of using leverage to avoid taxation are high, but it has been repeatedly
shown that firms do not fully utilize leverage. Companies in lower tax countries have debt,
which may or may not be associated with taxes. However, we see that as tax rates increase, debt
levels of companies subjected to those tax rates increases simultaneously. Mean and median
leverage figures increase steadily with tax rate hikes. The data reflects that this relationship is
positive and significant indicating that firms do have higher leverage when operating in countries
with higher tax rates.

II. Data
The data used in this paper comes from COMPUSTAT. It is a compilation of financial
reporting data and effective tax rates from 84 different countries. There are over 280,000
country-firm-year observations, which span over 1993 to 2013. The primary objects of concern
are effective tax rates and leverage. Leverage is a simple calculation of debt over firm value.
The dependent variable interest coverage is a ratio that indicates the ability of a firm to make
interest payments on their debt. With simultaneous increases in debt and taxes, the interest
coverage ratio should decrease because of the higher payments required on the additional debt.
The other dependent variables that this paper examines are two leverage measures, and
are expected to have a positive relationship with effective tax rate. The first, book value
leverage, is calculated as the sum of short- and long-term debt divided by the sum of total debt
4

and the book value of shareholders equity. The net book leverage ratio is the same as above,
with total debt minus cash in the numerator. The final measure is related to interest coverage.
This ratio is expected to have a negative relationship with the effective tax rate, since firms will
have more debt and therefore be less able to pay their interest payments. The interest coverage
ratio is defined as EBITDA divided by interest expense. The regression in the paper is run on
the natural log of interest coverage, which is the natural log of 1 plus the interest coverage ratio.
This was done in Faulkender and Smith (2014) which scales the annual cash flow obligations
relative to the size of the firm.

III. Results
Table 1 shows summary statistics for all of the variables in the data set. It reflects the
minimum, maximum, mean, median, standard deviation and sample size for each of the
dependent and independent variables. This table gives a brief overview of what is contained in
the sample. It is interesting to note that the net book leverage minimum and maximum are
almost symmetrical around zero, but the mean and median are quite far from those values. Also,
the range in values of the natural log of interest coverage is quite wide, indicating less
consistency in that ratio.
The first column in table 2 contains summary statistics of leverage related to the effective
tax rate for the entire data set. All ratios have been winsorized at the 95th and 5th percentiles,
respectively. I have also removed negative and zero leverage. The data is separated into
quartiles by effective tax rate. The first quartile, with the lowest mean and median tax rates, also
contains firms with the lowest mean and median leverage to firm value ratio. The fourth quartile
5

has the highest mean and median tax rates, as well as the highest leverage ratios. Leverage and
tax rates for the two middle firms also increase by quartile. Thus, these summary statistics show
that with higher tax rates many corporations do, in fact, have more debt. As expected, with tax
rate increases leverage ratios also tend to increase. This indicates that corporations do use debt
as a tax shield, especially when they face high tax rates.
The second column of table 2 shows the interactive summary statistics for the interest
coverage ratio related to the effective tax rate. The first quartiles show a low tax rate and a high
interest coverage ratio. As we move down along each quartile, the tax rates increase and the
interest coverage ratios decrease as expected. The fourth quartile, however, shows a spike in the
interest coverage ratio. This is not intuitive, as these firms are shown to have more debt, and
should therefore be less able to cover their interest payments. This is, however, only a summary
statistic, and the results may hold as expected when controlling for access to the external market.
The regression run below shows a positive relationship, so this anomaly in the last quartile may
be strong enough to skew the results.
Table 3 shows the leverage book value, net book leverage and natural log of interest
coverage regressions run with between effects.

It is done this way because the between

regressions average out the time component, which shows the results essentially as crosssectional without a time variable. The time variable may cause relational errors, and where we
don’t expect companies to change their country of operation often, it makes sense to view the
results as cross-sectional.
The first column of table 3 shows the results from the book value leverage regression.
These results indicate a positive relationship between effective tax rates and leverage, consistent
with corporate finance theory, Faulkender and Smith (2015), and my hypothesis in this study.
6

The regression gave a high t-statistic, so it is highly significant. This regression is also indicative
of a positive relationship between book value leverage and sales, which makes sense. It would
seem that firms with higher sales would be able to take on more debt. The coefficient on PP&E
is also significantly positive.
The second column in table 3 shows the results from the regression on net book leverage.
These results also indicate a positive relationship between leverage and tax rates. This is
consistent with the results of the other regression and the expectations of this and other papers.
The relationship between leverage and sales is again positive, along with PP&E. These results
are consistent with the book value leverage regression, and further validate the inferences made
about these relationships.
The final column in table 3 lists the results from the between effect regression on interest
coverage. These results are just the opposite of the summary statistics relating interest coverage
to tax rates. We see a positive coefficient on effective tax rate in this regression. This indicates
that as tax rates increase, raising leverage ratios with it, the ability of the firms to pay back all of
their interest payments on this debt also increase. Theory suggests that the relationship should be
just the opposite, and this regression contradicts that and the summary statistics. Possible reasons
for this discrepancy are errors across the time variable and the anomaly in the fourth quartile.
Sales and interest coverage have a positive relationship in this regression. This makes sense
because as sales increase, a firm will have more of an ability to pay back the interest on their
debts. However, the coefficient on sales is not very high in this regression. Also, the coefficient
on property, plant and equipment is negative.
Table 4 shows the regression results on book value leverage using OLS. This results in a
positive, yet insignificant, coefficient on effective tax rates. The OLS regressions on the other
7

dependent variables brought about coefficients of opposite signage from the between effect
regressions. This is inconsistent with the interactive results and the between effect regressions.
These mixed results for the interest coverage regressions may be due to the fourth quartile, where
the interest coverage ratio breaks pattern and increases in the highest tax bracket.

The

discrepancies in the net book leverage and insignificance in the book value leverage results may
be related to an error in the data. I ran multiple regressions to account for various different
factors. I included year dummies, removed year dummies, clustered the results by gvkey or
country and tried different combinations of these things. My hypothesis is that the unbalanced
nature of the time series within the cross-sectional data is causing the problem. That would
explain why the between effect regressions hold the trend as expected, but OLS does not. The
between effect regressions average out the time factor, and therefore yield proper results.

IV. Conclusion
The results shown in the between effect regressions on leverage substantiate the
hypothesis in this paper and those of Faulkender and Smith (2015). It is quite clear that there is a
positive relationship between the tax rates that companies face and their debt to firm value ratio.
The best theoretical explanation for this, validated by the data, is that firms are using debt to
shield a portion of their income from being taxed by the government. Debt is a great instrument
to use for this purpose because interest payments are subtracted before income taxes are
calculated. The more debt a company has, the less they will pay in taxes because less income
will be subject to taxation. Firms will want to prevent over-levering their operation, which will
have detrimental effects on the firm overall, as it will dramatically increase their likelihood of
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bankruptcy and therefore increase their cost of leverage. Optimal capital structure balances the
tax benefit of leverage with the cost of bankruptcy.
The interest coverage results, however, do not support these beliefs. As taxes rise,
leverage rises. This should increase interest expense and therefore decrease the interest coverage
ratio. Interest expense is the denominator of the interest expense ratio, so as it increases, the
ratio overall should decrease. The regression, however, shows just the opposite. This may be
due to errors in the time variable or the fourth quartile anomaly. These discrepancies are
interesting, and should be explored further in a paper that researches this at a deeper level.
The contribution of this paper is that it shows that this positive relationship between
leverage and tax rates across multiple countries of incorporation. Faulkender and Smith (2014)
show that this trend holds within multinational corporations based in the United States, but has
not looked beyond those borders at the rest of the world. In their working paper, Faulkender and
Smith (2015) will look at the global trend, based on the same data used in this study. This paper
will give them a starting place for evidence of a basic trend that they will then expand on.
The evidence in this paper is reliant on between effect regressions. This is sensible
because these regressions average out the time component and shows the results as a timeaveraged OLS. If the time component can be fixed or controlled, like it is in the between effect
regressions, the trend holds significantly between leverage and taxes. The p-values from these
regressions are quite low. The results may be stronger with more data, more time, or a better
time measure.

This paper does have enough evidence, though, to support a likely trend

worldwide. The theory that corporate tax rates do play a role in capital structure is supported by
this paper, among many others, and is therefore probable, not only for corporations based in the
United States, but those all over the world as well.
9
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Table 1
Summary Statistics
Table 1 shows the minimum, maximum, mean, median and standard deviation of each variable. The variables have
all been winsorized at the 95th and 5th percentiles.

Min

Max

Mean

Median

St Dev

Observations

Book Value Leverage

0.000

0.8008

0.3216

0.3023

0.2471

288,344

Net Book Leverage

-0.6679

0.6975

0.0959

0.1435

0.3689

288,321

ln Interest Coverage

-0.0040

5.7886

2.4405

2.1428

1.4710

236,280

Effective Tax Rate

0.1700

0.5160

0.3256

0.3140

0.0836

289,423

ln Sales

-0.8074

12.7734

6.7029

6.6444

3.5619

289,407

PP&E

0.0227

0.7369

0.3051

0.2907

0.2082

289,413

Return on Assets

-0.1646

0.1926

0.0423

0.0481

0.0824

288,607

Depreciation

0.0049

0.0902

0.0347

0.0312

0.0229

268,392

Dividends (Dummy)

0.000

1.000

0.8873

1.000

0.3162

289,423
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Table 2
Interactive Variables Summary
Table 2 presents the interactive summary statistics by quartile. The first section shows the positive relationship
between leverage and tax rates. This shows the trend of increasing tax leverage as tax rates increase. The leverage
is calculated as total debt of the firm divided by the firm value. This ratio is winsorized at the 95th and 5th
percentiles.
The second section shows the negative relationship between the interest coverage ratio and tax rates, until the fourth
quartile. This shows that as taxes and leverage increase, the interest coverage ratio decreases, with the anomaly of
the last quartile. The interest coverage ratio was calculated as EBITDA divided by interest expense. The results
presented here are actually related to the natural log of interest coverage, which is calculated as ln(1 + interest
coverage ratio). These ratios are also winsorized at the 95 th and 5th percentiles.

Leverage
Quartile
1

Tax
Rates
0.2227

Mean
Leverage
0.2266

2

0.2955

0.2954

3

0.3435

4

0.4419

ln Interest Coverage
Median
Leverage
0.25

Tax
Rates
0.2227

Mean
ln Int Cov
2.3411

Median
ln Int Cov
2.1206

0.30

0.2955

2.1792

1.9716

0.3435

0.34

0.3435

2.0422

1.8936

0.4408

0.43

0.4419

2.5287

2.3238
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Table 3
Between Effect Regressions
Table 3 presents the results of the between effects regressions on book value leverage, net book leverage and the
natural log of interest coverage. The first section displays the results from the regression on book value leverage. It
shows the positive, significant coefficient of the effective tax rate. The second section shows the results from the
regression on net book leverage. It, too, shows the positive, significant coefficient of the effective tax rate. The
final column shows the results from the ln interest coverage regression.
Book value leverage is calculated as total debt divided by total debt plus shareholder’s equity. Net book leverage is
calculated the same as book leverage, except with total debt minus cash and marketable securities in the numerator.
The ln interest coverage is calculated as the natural log of one plus the interest coverage ratio, which is calculated as
EBITDA divided by interest expense. The independent variables are as follows: lnsales is just the natural log of
sales, ppeb is property, plant and equipment, calculated as PP&E divided by total assets, roa is the return on assets,
calculated as EBIT divided total assets, depr is the depreciation variable, calculated as depreciation divided by total
assets and divs is a dummy variable that indicates whether or not a firm paid dividends that year. All of these
dependent and independent variables have been winsorized at the 95th and 5th percentiles.
The regression models are as follows:
𝐵𝑉 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑡𝑎𝑥 + 𝛽2 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑏𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐵𝑉 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑡𝑎𝑥 + 𝛽2 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑏𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡
ln 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑡𝑎𝑥 + 𝛽2 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑏𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡

Book Value Leverage

Net Book Leverage

ln Interest Coverage

efftaxrate

0.2165***
(0.0164)

0.2317***
(0.0241)

0.2217**
(0.0922)

lnsales

0.0179***
(0.0004)

0.0215***
(0.0006)

0.0229***
(0.0023)

ppeb

0.2495***
(0.0064)
-0.3980***
(0.0177)

0.6266***
(0.0095)
-0.3625***
(0.0261)

-1.3655***
(0.0373)
13.8041***
(0.1290)

depr

0.5612***
(0.0621)

0.6721***
(0.0915)

6.5863***
(0.3556)

divs

-0.0081*
(0.0043)

0.0678***
(0.0064)

0.2032***
(0.0241)

N

266,664

266,655

222,441

R²

0.1208

0.1728

0.2912

roa
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Table 4
OLS Regression Results
Table 4 shows the results from the OLS regression on book value leverage. It shows the positive, yet insignificant
coefficient of the effective tax rate. Book value leverage is calculated as total debt divided by total debt plus
shareholder’s equity. The independent variables are as follows: lnsales is just the natural log of sales, ppeb is
property, plant and equipment, calculated as PP&E divided by total assets, roa is the return on assets, calculated as
EBIT divided total assets, depr is the depreciation variable, calculated as depreciation divided by total assets and
divs is a dummy variable that indicates whether or not a firm paid dividends that year. The dependent and
independent variables have been winsorized at the 95th and 5th percentiles.

The model:
𝐵𝑉 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑡𝑎𝑥 + 𝛽2 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑏𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟1𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽8 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟2𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟3𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟4𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟5𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽12 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟6𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽13 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟7𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽14 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟8𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽15 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟9𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽16 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟10𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽17 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟11𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽18 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟12𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽19 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟13𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽20 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟14𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽21 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟15𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽22 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟16𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽23 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟17𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽24 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟18𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽25 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟19𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽26 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟20𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡
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efftaxrate
lnsales
ppeb
roa
depr
divs
y1
y2
y3
y4
y5
y6
y7
y8
y9
y10
y11
y12
y13
y14
y15
y16
y17
y18
y19
y20

Book
Value
Leverage
0.0103
(0.0066)
0.0187***
(0.0001)
0.2188***
(0.0023)
-0.4537***
(0.0058)
0.4985***
(0.0209)
-0.0267***
(0.0014)
Omitted
-0.0109
(0.0074)
-0.0093
(0.0072)
-0.0008
(0.0064)
0.0054
(0.0060)
0.0040
(0.0059)
0.0033
(0.0058)
-0.0102
(0.0058)
-0.0128**
(0.0058)
-0.0141**
(0.0057)
-0.0136**
(0.0057)
-0.0165***
(0.0057)
-0.0183***
(0.0057)
-0.0351***
(0.0057)
-0.0406***
(0.0057)
-0.0346***
(0.0057)
-0.0445***
(0.0057)
-0.0536***
(0.0057)
-0.0567***
(0.0057)
-0.0474***
(0.0057)
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